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Under  asymmetric  information  conditions  regarding  worker  productivity 
between current and prospective employers, a worker‟s promotion signals his/her 
productivity.  In  this  paper,  we  tested  the  signalling  role  of  promotion,  using 
Japanese micro-level data. We found that among lower-level positions, promotion 
seems to signal a worker‟s ability, and both the business cycle and foreign-capital 
ratio  of  his/her  company  significantly  strengthen  this  effects.  These  results 
suggest  that  external  labour  market  conditions  (i.e.  asymmetric  information 
regarding a worker‟s abilities between a current and prospective employer) affect 
the economic differences among workers in the internal labour market. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The pace of promotion in Japanese large firms tends to be slower than that seen in 
firms  in  Western  developed  countries.  In  Japan,  workers  with  similar  observable 
characteristics are typically not differentiated until they have been in the workforce for 
approximately 10-15 years (Itoh 1991). The phenomenon of the Japanese firms waiting 
a considerable length of time to select workers in a promotion competition, which is 
termed „late selection‟, has been explained in several studies (e.g. Ariga et al. 2000). 
This paper sheds light on aspects of the asymmetric employer learning approach by 
considering a case wherein (1) the current employer has the advantage of observing a 
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worker‟s productivity, and (2) the task assignments by the current employer are publicly 
observable. In such a case, the promotion of a worker to a higher-level task reveals 
information regarding the worker‟s productivity to potential employers, which in turn 
raises the wage cost to deter the worker from leaving the current employer. The current 
employer  then  has  an  incentive  to  delay  the  promotion  of  the  worker  in  that  the 
wage-cost  savings  realised  by  delaying  the  promotion  exceeds  the  increase  in 
productivity realised by promoting the worker to the higher-level task. Moreover, if a 
worker‟s education level signals his or her productivity, the incentive for the current 
employer to delay the promotion of less-educated workers is especially strong. 
  The existence of the signalling role of promotion implies that the current employer has 
the incentive to exploit the value of private information at the expense of efficiency in 
social productivity. Moreover, if the promotion process contains state dependency, that is, 
the  experience  of  higher-level  task  changes  the  worker‟s  ability  or  preference  in 
conforming to further higher-level tasks, promotion differences made possible by the 
current  employer‟s  strategic  behavior  will  produce  long-term  economic  disparity  in 
terms of promotion opportunities. 
  The purpose of this paper is to test the signalling role of promotion by using Japanese 
micro-level data. If a worker‟s education level has a signalling role under the condition 
of asymmetric employer learning,  a wage increase in line  with  a promotion  will be 
larger for less-educated workers than for highly educated ones. Because the amount of 
information revealed by a promotion is greater for lesser-educated workers, a current 
employer will be more inclined to raising the wages for lesser-educated workers in order 
to retain them. 
We owe our empirical model to DeVaro and Waldman (2009), who tested the signalling 
role of education by using the personnel records of a US firm in the financial-service 
industry. They estimated the wage function for different education-level groups and 
tested the differences in wage increases owing to promotions among these different 
groups. We rearranged Japanese micro-level data in order to acquire pseudo-panel data 
regarding  education  categories,  and  tested  the  differences  in  wage  growth  due  to 
promotion using the same empirical model. 
  Wage  growth  in  line  with  promotion  also  depends  on  the  business  cycle  and 
foreign-capital ratio of the firm that employs the worker. During an economic boom, the 
total labour demand curve will shift upwards; as a result, the wage cost for the current 
employer to retain  the worker will increase. On  the other hand, if  firms with  high 
foreign-capital ratios have a stronger tendency to hire mid-career workers than low 
foreign-capital firms, the wage cost for the current employer to retain the worker will 3 
 
increases for industries where the foreign-capital ratio tend to be high. As an original 
contribution to the literature, this paper examines the effects of the business cycle and 
foreign-capital ratio of a firm on wage growth due to promotion.   
  The analysis in this paper is structured in the following manner: Section 2 explains the 
theoretical backgrounds of the empirical model. Section 3 provides a data description, 
whereas section4 shows the estimation model and reports the empirical results; the 
latter section includes a subsection that briefly examines the effects of a firm‟s business 
cycle  and  foreign-capital  ratio.  Section  5  summarizes  our  empirical  findings  and 
discusses policy implications. 
 
2.  Theoretical Background 
 
  As a worker‟s potential productivity is unobservable, employers have learned to predict 
worker  productivity  by  gleaning  some  observable  characteristics  (e.g.  educational 
attainment, qualifications, and past job experience). If the observable characteristics 
are  deemed  sufficient  for  predicting  a  worker‟s  potential  productivity,  then  an 
employer‟s information regarding a worker‟s productivity is said to be symmetric, that 
is, both the current employer and  prospective employer have the same information 
regarding a worker‟s productivity. Symmetric employer learning is a phenomenon that 
was empirically supported by Farber and Gibbons (1996)、Altonji and Pierret (2001)  、  
and  Schonberg  (2007).  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  worker‟s  productivity  is  marked  or 
affected  by  unobservable  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  quality,  then  an  employer‟s 
information regarding a worker‟s productivity is said to be asymmetric, that is, the 
current  employer  has  an  information  advantage  over  the  prospective  employer 
regarding the worker‟s productivity. Asymmetric employer learning is a phenomenon 
that is supported by the findings of Gibbons and Katz (1991) and DeVaro and Waldman 
(2009). This paper uses the analytical framework of DeVaro and Waldman (2009) for 
examining “asymmetric employer learning” in the Japanese labour market. 
 
This  study‟s empirical analysis  is  based  on  the  strategic delayed promotion  model 
(Waldman  1984,  Ricart  i  Costa  1988,  Bernhardt  1995,  Ishida  2004).  Under  the 
circumstance where the current employer can observe the worker‟s productivity, but 
prospective employers cannot, we consider that either task assignment within a firm or 
the  worker‟s  educational  level  could  signal  that  worker‟s  productivity  for  every 
prospective employer.   
  As  DeVaro  and  Waldman  (2009)  indicated,  we  can  derive  the  following  testable 4 
 
implications. The first implication is that the incentive to distort the promotion decision 
decreases  according  to  a  worker‟s  educational  level.  Since  a  promotion  produces 
information  regarding  a  worker‟s  productivity  that  is  observable  by  prospective 
employers, the current employer will delay the promotion of workers who produce more 
information because these workers incur higher wage costs; they are paid higher wages 
to prevent them from being bid away from the firm. If the promotion of less-educated 
workers produces more information regarding productivity than that produced on the 
promotion  of  highly  educated  workers,  the  promotion  rate  will  increase  with 
educational level, even if there are no differences between  the workers  in  terms  of 
unobserved characteristics. 
  The second implication, which is closely related to the first implication, is that wage 
increase due to promotion decreases according to worker educational level. Because 
more information due to promotion is produced for less-educated workers, the current 
employer must pay a higher wage, that is, an amount that corresponds with the market 
wage if an employee would receive on being promoted. 
  Third, since a promotion early in the career signals a worker‟s capability, these two 
aforementioned implications hold more weakly for a promotion late in the career. This 
paper tests the second implication of the signalling role of promotion3. 
 
3.  Data 
 
  We  used  a  micro-level  data-set  from  the  Basic  Survey  on  Wage  Structure  (Wage 
Census), gathered between 1989 and 2008. The Japanese government (i.e., the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare) compiles this survey annually and covers almost every 
region and industry (except agriculture) in Japan. It contains information regarding an 
employee‟s wage and working days/hours, according to worker attributes (age/tenure 
group, gender, educational attainment, full-time/part-time status, class of position, etc.) 
and firm attributes (industry, firm size, etc.). 
There are four classes of positions: director (bu-cho), section manager (ka-cho), chief 
(kakari-cho) and foreman (shoku-cho). From the non-official positions (hi-yakushoku), 
white-collar workers ascend the promotion ladder in the following order: chief, section 
manager, and director. Blue-collar workers, on the other hand, ascend in a different 
order, which is as follows: foreman, chief, section manager, and director4. 
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For  panel-data  analysis,  we  constructed  a  pseudo-panel  data-set.  We  limited  the 
sample  to  male  standard  employees  who  were  senior  high  school  or  university 
graduates, and who were also full-time workers employed by establishments with 10 or 
more employees5. Subsequently, we constructed a pseudo-cohort data-set for senior high 
school graduates and university graduates whose tenure was 10-19 years (Figures1 and 
2). For example, university graduates who were 32 years old and would complete tenure 
of 10 years in 1989, and those who continued to work at the same enterprise until they 
41 years old and would complete a tenure of 19 years, belonged to cohort1. 
  We calculated the mean value of real wage per hour, the class-of-position (i.e., director, 
section manager,  chief,  foreman) dummy, and  the  establishment size  to which  the 
employee belonged to. The real wage per hour was calculated by dividing the sum of the 
total payment and one-twelfth of the total bonus payment denominated by  consumer 
price index (CPI), the sum of the contracted hours of work, and all overtime work hours.  
  Table1 shows the mean value of real wage per hour,  class-of-position dummy, and 
establishment size. The tables show that the white-collar executive job (i.e., director, 
section manager, and chief)  ratio  among  the university graduates exceed ed that of 
senior high school graduates. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
  We used a pseudo-panel data set for university/senior high school graduates with 11 
cohort groups, over a period of 10 years. 
  The empirical specification is as follows6: 
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it W   indicates the mean value of real wage per hour of an individual who belongs to 
cohort  i , year  t .  lt P   is  the ratio of employees who obtained rank  l   in  year  t , and 
Senior Edu_   is the dummy variable for senior high school graduates.  it X   is a vector 
of  control  variables  that  includes  tenure,  dummy  variable  for  senior   high  school 
graduate,  and  logarithms  of  enterprise  size.  i    and  it    are  the  cohort-specific 
component and error term, respectively. We estimated the equation for university/senior 
high  school  graduates  separately.  If  educational  attainment  serves  as  a  signal  of   a 
worker‟s  productivity,  a  promotion  would  produce  information  regarding  a  worker‟s 
productivity more readily among senior high school graduates than among university 
graduates.  Then,  wage  growth  according  to  promotion  is  larger  among  senior  high 
school graduates than among university graduates, while controlling for unobserved 
characteristics; this is expressed as  0 2  l    in equation (1). Our empirical strategy is 
to  test  the  hypothesis  0 2  l    for  each  rank  (i.e.,  director,  section  manager,  chief, 
foreman). 
 
  Table2 shows the empirical results for the aggregate of all industries and all cohort 
groups. For chief and foreman, the coefficients of cross-terms with senior high school 
graduates were significantly positive, suggesting that the signalling role of promotion 
exists  for  these  lower  ranks;  this  finding  is  consistent  with  the  third  implication 
mentioned  above:  for  low-level  position  workers,  wage  increases  due  to  promotion 
decrease as education level increases7. On the other hand, the coefficients of cross-terms 
with senior high school graduates were significantly negative for each of directors and 
section managers. What does this mean? One can take one of two interpretations of the 
coefficient  2l    . One interpretation, which has been mentioned previously, is from the 
perspective  of  asymmetric  employer  learning ;  however  the  difference  between 
university  and  senior  high  school  graduates  in  terms  of wage  growth  in  line  with 
promotion  can  be explained  by  the  technical  complementarities  between  rank  and 
education level8. If a higher job rank complements higher educational attainment, that 
is, the increase of productivity is higher for university graduates than for senior high 
school graduates, then it is possible that  wage growth with promotion increases with 
educational attainment.  
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4.1   Effects of Business Cycle 
 
The effects of revealed information regarding a worker‟s productivity, as seen through 
his or her promotion, on wage growth may depend on the business cycle of the firm in 
question. When the economy is booming and aggregate labour demand is vigorous, wage 
growth used to mitigate potential poaching increases. In order to control the business 
cycle as it affects wage growth,  we divided the cohort group by intensity of labour 
demand. In this paper, we adopted the Active Job Openings to Applicants (Yuko-Kyujin 
Bairitsu;  hereafter,  AJOA)  from  the  Employment  Referrals  for  General  Workers 
surveyed by Japan‟s Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare as an index of intensity of 
labour demand. Figure3 shows the AJOA from 1989 to 2008; it shows that that the ratio 
showed  a  downward  trend  between  1991  and  2002,  and  then  increased  again.  We 
calculated the average value of AJOA in each cohort, for each 10-year period9. The 
results were as follows: cohort1, 0.82; cohort2, 0.75; cohort3, 0.67; cohort4, 0.59; cohort5, 
0.51; cohort6, 0.51; cohort7, 0.52; cohort8, 0.54; cohort9, 0.58; cohort10, 0.61; cohort11, 
0.64. We divided the original sample into two groups, the High AJOA Cohort (cohort1, 
cohort2, cohort3, cohort4, cohort9, cohort10, and cohort11), and the Low AJOA Cohort 
(cohort5,  cohort6,  cohort7,  and  cohort8).  Table3  presents  the  estimated  regressor 
coefficients for both the Low AJOA Cohort and High AJOA Cohort; the estimates are 
broadly similar between the two. Comparing the size of coefficients for the cross-terms 
of the foreman ratio and the senior high school dummy, the coefficients were larger in 
the High AJOA Cohort. This result shows the possibility of strengthening the signalling 
role in the promotion of a foreman during an economic boom. On the other hand, the 
coefficients for the cross-terms of the section manager ratio and the senior high school 
dummy in the High AJOA Cohort group had larger negative absolute values. This result 
can be explained  as the strengthening of complementarities between the work  of a 
section manager and educational attainment, because of the economic boom. 
 
4.2 Effects of Foreign-Capital Ratio 
 
  In  this  section,  we  test  the  hypothesis  that  the  signalling  role  of  a  promotion  is 
stronger in firms whose industries tend to bear high foreign-capital ratios. The reasons 
for the hypothesis are as follows10. First, because these firms are subsidiaries of their 
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respective overseas parent companies, their  human resource management, which  is 
based on the global labour market, falls under the influence of the parent company. 
Second, because these tend to be „small‟ companies, their development of an internal 
labour market tends to be limited. As a result, human resource allocation is more likely 
to  rely  on  the  external  labour  market.  Third,  because  these  are  newly  established 
companies,  their  hiring  tends  to  focus  more  on  mid-individuals,  to  employ  skilled 
workers. 
  The Basic Survey on Wage Structure dataset does not include the foreign-capital ratio 
index,  and  so,  we  used  the  Establishment  and  Enterprise  Census  (Jigyosho,  Kigyo 
Toukei Chosa) from  the years 1998-2001, 2004-2005, and 2008, in  order to identify 
workers who belong to firms whose industries tend to bear high foreign-capital ratio. 
This survey was conducted on all establishments in Japan; it provides basic data on 
establishments and enterprises, such as the industry size and the number of persons 
engaged.  The  foreign-capital  ratio  index  was  surveyed  in  the  years  1998-2001, 
2004-2005, and 2008, and we merged the Establishment and Enterprise Census dataset 
with that of the Basic Survey on Wage Structure, in terms individual worker ID. 
  Table5  presents  the  distribution  of  workers  classified  by  foreign-capital  ratio.  The 
percentage of workers in the finance industry whose enterprises were fully owned by 
foreign  capital  was  higher  than  that  in  any  other  industry;  in  other  industries, 
approximately  90%  of  the  workers  had  been  hired  by  enterprises  where  the 
foreign-capital ratio was 0%. We calculated the mean value of the foreign-capital ratios 
of enterprises, by industry, and averaged for the sample period. The results were as 
follows:  finance,  2.970%;  wholesale,  1.356%;  manufacturing,  1.116%;  transportation, 
0.559%; real estate, 0.544%; utilities, 0.475%; services, 0.401%; mining, 0.382%; and 
construction,  0.223%.  In  this  paper,  we  define  the  finance,  wholesale,  and 
manufacturing industries as „high foreign-capital ratio industries‟, and the real estate, 
transportation,  utilities,  services,  mining,  and  construction  industries  as  „low 
foreign-capital ratio industries‟. 
  Table4 shows separate estimates of the wage equations for the „high foreign-capital 
ratio  industries‟  and  „low  foreign-capital  ratio  industries‟.  The  coefficients  for  the 
cross-terms of the chief ratio and senior high school dummy, and those of the foreman 
ratio  and  senior  high  school  dummy  for  „high  foreign-capital  ratio  industries‟  were 
significantly positive, although the size of the coefficients were insignificant for „low 
foreign-capital ratio industries‟. These results indicate that the poaching intensity for 
chief and foreman is higher among high foreign-capital ratio industries. 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
  As Ishikawa (2001) noted, if „in the market, we say that the „genuine wage disparity‟ 
that  is  problematic  exists  when  there  are  workers  who  have  the  same  ability  and 
preference and yet do not obtain the same job opportunity (p.246)‟. Promotions that are 
strategically delayed by exploiting the information asymmetry between the current and 
prospective  employers  may  produce  a  „genuine  wage  disparity‟  among  workers,  if 
promotion has some state dependency.   
In order to examine the existence of strategically delayed promotion in Japan, we used 
Japanese micro-level data to test the signalling role of promotion, which is considered 
an element of asymmetric information between the current employer and prospective 
employer. We found that promotion from lower-level positions (e.g. promotion to chief 
[kakari-cho]  or  foreman  [shoku-cho]  apparently  signal  a  worker‟s  ability,  and  the 
business cycle and foreign-capital ratio of that worker‟s employing firm can significantly 
strengthen  these  effects.  These  results  suggest  that  an  external  labour  market 
condition  (i.e.  asymmetric  information  regarding  a  worker‟s  abilities,  between  the 
current employer and prospective employer) exacerbates economic differences among 
workers through the internal labour market (i.e. the promotion process). Whenever we 
analyse the „genuine wage disparity‟ through the internal labour market, the external 
labour market condition must also be considered. 
  Whether strategically delayed promotions produce a „genuine wage disparity‟ among 
workers in the long term depends on the state dependency of promotion11. In future 
research, a test of state dependency in the promotion process in Japanese enterprises 
must be considered. 
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Figure1 Structure of Pseudo-Cohort (University Graduates)
Male University Graduates -age-
Cohort group
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
year 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1989 32
1990 32 33
1991 32 33 34
1992 32 33 34 35
1993 32 33 34 35 36
1994 32 33 34 35 36 37
1995 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
1996 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1997 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
1998 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
1999 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
2000 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
2001 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
2002 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
2003 36 37 38 39 40 41
2004 37 38 39 40 41
2005 38 39 40 41
2006 39 40 41
2007 40 41
2008 41
Male University Graduates -tenure-
Cohort group
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
year 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1989 10
1990 10 11
1991 10 11 12
1992 10 11 12 13
1993 10 11 12 13 14
1994 10 11 12 13 14 15
1995 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1996 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1997 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1998 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1999 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2001 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2002 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2003 14 15 16 17 18 19
2004 15 16 17 18 19
2005 16 17 18 19
2006 17 18 19
2007 18 19
2008 19
Source: Basic Survey on Wage Structure (microdata).13 
 
Figure2 Structure of Pseudo-Cohort (Senior High School Graduates)
Male Senior High School Graduates -age-
Cohort group
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
year 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1989 28
1990 28 29
1991 28 29 30
1992 28 29 30 31
1993 28 29 30 31 32
1994 28 29 30 31 32 33
1995 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
1996 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
1997 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
1998 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
1999 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
2000 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
2001 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
2002 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
2003 32 33 34 35 36 37
2004 33 34 35 36 37
2005 34 35 36 37
2006 35 36 37
2007 36 37
2008 37
Male Senioir High School Graduates -tenure-
Cohort group
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
year 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1989 10
1990 10 11
1991 10 11 12
1992 10 11 12 13
1993 10 11 12 13 14
1994 10 11 12 13 14 15
1995 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1996 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1997 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1998 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1999 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2001 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2002 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2003 14 15 16 17 18 19
2004 15 16 17 18 19
2005 16 17 18 19
2006 17 18 19
2007 18 19
2008 19





Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Real Wage 0.344 0.34 0.347 0.349 0.353 0.349 0.347 0.348 0.348 0.349 0.349
per Hour  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.042)
Director 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.009 0.009
 (0.010)  (0.087)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)
Section 0.145 0.141 0.14 0.138 0.135 0.133 0.12 0.115 0.125 0.124 0.107
 Manager  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.091)  (0.093)  (0.091)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.081)  (0.090)  (0.093)  (0.082)
Chief 0.169 0.18 0.188 0.183 0.183 0.185 0.176 0.182 0.175 0.164 0.167
 (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.020)
Foreman 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.011 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.011
 (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)
Establish 403.6 451.3 511.8 542.4 531.3 529.5 529.6 536.3 487.7 422.1 467.4
 -ment Size   (35.6)   (50.3)   (83.2)   (47.6)   (27.6)   (33.8)   (42.8)   (79.6)   (63.7)   (96.6)   (99.5)
Sample Size 2459 2863 3219 3220 2763 2605 2934 2877 2342 2311 2585
Male Senior High School Graduates
Cohort group
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Real Wage 0.254 0.255 0.256 0.256 0.254 0.252 0.252 0.248 0.244 0.24 0.241
per Hour  (0.040)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022)
Director 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 0.0006 0.0002 0.0007 0.001 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0008)  (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Section 0.01 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.01
 Manager  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.009)
Chief 0.061 0.052 0.046 0.045 0.051 0.046 0.042 0.044 0.049 0.044 0.042
 (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.030)
Foreman 0.04 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.051 0.05 0.051 0.047 0.04 0.043
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.016)
Establish 462.3 570.3 658.8 635 524.4 545.8 574.1 534.9 433 357.3 416.8
 -ment Size   (52.3)   (79.9)   (89.1)   (59.5)   (37.8)   (42.3)   (47.7)   (40.3)   (39.5)   (33.7)   (19.8)
Sample Size 1294 1491 1724 1672 1575 1592 1694 1654 1593 1467 1525
Note: Mean value of 10 years. Standard errors in parentheses.15 
 
Table2 Estimates of Wage Equations (All Industries, All Cohort Group)
Fixed Random
Effects Effects
Director ratio -1.312 -0.629
   (0.810)    (0.812)
Section manager ratio 0.190 -0.049
   (0.169)    (0.127)
Chief ratio 0.245 0.166
   (0.134)    (0.126)
Foreman ratio -3.377 -4.143
   (0.878)    (0.878)
Director ratio -11.613 -10.829
 *Senior high school graduates    (6.337)    (6.029)
   dummy
Section Manager ratio -3.435 -3.956
 *Senior high school graduates    (0.857)    (0.792)
   dummy
Chief ratio 1.327 1.180
 *Senior high school graduates    (0.463)    (0.338)
   dummy
Foreman ratio 2.483 3.225
 *Senior high school graduates    (1.025)    (0.978)
   dummy
Tenure 0.034 0.040
   (0.004)    (0.003)
Senior high school graduates          - -0.336
 dummy    (0.029)
ln (establishment size) -0.032 0.046
   (0.022)    (0.012)
Sample size 220 220
R-squared 0.397 0.981
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.16 
 
Table3 Estimates of Wage Equations (Each Cohort)
Low AJOA Cohort High AJOA Cohort
Fixed Random Fixed Random
Effects Effects Effects Effects
Director ratio -1.558 -1.471 -0.282 0.431
   (0.769)    (0.799)    (1.097)    (1.080)
Section manager ratio 0.094 0.322 0.009 -0.268
   (0.203)    (0.156)    (0.212)     (0.157)
Chief ratio -0.215 -0.102 0.463 0.346
   (0.126)    (0.116)    (0.188)    (0.174)
Foreman ratio -0.757 -0.815 -3.725 -4.760
   (0.813)    (0.836)    (1.223)    (1.194)
Director ratio -5.149 -6.358 -13.680 -9.343
 *Senior high school graduates    (4.968)    (4.975)    (9.843)    (9.270)
   dummy
Section Manager ratio -2.202 -2.680 -4.114 -4.652
 *Senior high school graduates    (0.930)    (0.954)    (1.205)    (1.098)
   dummy
Chief ratio 0.649 1.421 1.262 1.081
 *Senior high school graduates    (0.465)    (0.394)    (0.617)    (0.446)
   dummy
Foreman ratio 0.879 0.716 2.373 3.243
 *Senior high school graduates    (0.936)    (0.913)    (1.428)    (1.389)
   dummy
Tenure 0.034 0.028 0.039 0.046
   (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.004)
Senioir-high-school graduates          - -0.363          - -0.302
 dummy    (0.024)    (0.042)
ln (establishment size) 0.083 0.070 -0.026 0.045
   (0.025)    (0.024)     (0.030)    (0.015)
Sample size 80 80 140 140
R-squared 0.051 0.995 0.582 0.979
Notes: Standrad errors are in parentheses.
Low AJOA (Active Job Openings to Applicants) Cohort contains cohort5-8
 ,High AJOA Cohort contains cohort1-4 and 9-11.17 
 
Table4 Estimates of Wage Equation (Low and High Foreign Capital Ratio Industries)
Low foreign capital High foreign capital
ratio industries ratio industries
Fixed Random Fixed Random
Effects Effects Effects Effects
Director ratio -0.703 -0.578 -0.382 0.160
   (0.702)    (0.683)    (0.729)    (0.772)
Section manager ratio -0.252 -0.257 0.530 0.224
   (0.147)    (0.137)    (0.136)    (0.114)
Chief ratio 0.097 0.101 0.344 0.170
   (0.112)    (0.110)    (0.132)    (0.126)
Foreman ratio -3.572 -3.814 -2.224 -2.683
   (0.935)    (0.894)    (0.660)    (0.676)
Director ratio -9.515 -6.286 -7.328 -9.548
 *Senior high school graduates    (6.152)    (5.964)    (4.179)    (4.115)
   dummy
Section manager ratio -2.569 -3.483 -2.088 -2.200
 *Senior high school graduates    (1.247)    (1.191)    (0.525)    (0.527)
   dummy
Chief ratio -0.256 -0.147 0.975 0.912
 *Senior high school graduates    (0.404)    (0.383)    (0.341)    (0.279)
   dummy
Foreman ratio 2.138 2.339 2.642 2.807
 *Senior high school graduates    (1.496)    (1.434)    (0.749)    (0.732)
   dummy
Tenure 0.045 0.045 0.023 0.030
   (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.003)
Senioir high school graduates          - -0.221          - -0.416
 dummy    (0.025)    (0.030)
ln (establishment size) 0.014 0.039 -0.005 0.055
   (0.020)    (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.011)
Sample size 220 220 220 220
R-squared 0.462 0.961 0.326 0.983
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.18 
 
Table5 Transition of Fforeign-Capital Ratio, According to Industry
year: 1998
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.980 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.415
Construction 0.971 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.223
Manufacturing 0.941 0.053 0.004 0.002 0.992
Utilities 0.927 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.325
Transportation 0.958 0.037 0.001 0.004 0.673
Wholesale 0.937 0.049 0.005 0.008 1.674
Finance 0.728 0.267 0.000 0.005 2.387
Real estate 0.966 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.386
Services 0.979 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.307
year: 1999
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.977 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.454
Construction 0.969 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.253
Manufacturing 0.939 0.055 0.004 0.003 1.072
Utilities 0.935 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.271
Transportation 0.965 0.031 0.001 0.002 0.531
Wholesale 0.940 0.048 0.007 0.005 1.502
Finance 0.721 0.271 0.002 0.005 2.526
Real estate 0.964 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.491
Services 0.980 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.337
year: 2000
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.978 0.020 0.000 0.003 0.476
Construction 0.965 0.034 0.001 0.000 0.305
Manufacturing 0.935 0.059 0.004 0.002 1.091
Utilities 0.934 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.290
Transportation 0.965 0.032 0.001 0.002 0.478
Wholesale 0.936 0.050 0.006 0.008 1.726
Finance 0.721 0.271 0.002 0.006 2.535
Real estate 0.956 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.643
Services 0.979 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.292
Source: Establishment and Enterprise Census (microdata).19 
 
Table5 Transition of Foreign-Capital Ratio, According to Industry (continued)
year: 2001
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.978 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.444
Construction 0.968 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.237
Manufacturing 0.933 0.060 0.004 0.002 1.111
Utilities 0.931 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.309
Transportation 0.965 0.033 0.001 0.002 0.407
Wholesale 0.928 0.060 0.003 0.009 1.695
Finance 0.736 0.262 0.001 0.000 1.775
Real estate 0.955 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.653
Services 0.980 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.409
year: 2004
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.971 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.518
Construction 0.967 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.211
Manufacturing 0.951 0.043 0.004 0.003 1.001
Utilities 0.925 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.341
Transportation 0.965 0.031 0.001 0.003 0.726
Wholesale 0.950 0.040 0.003 0.007 1.375
Finance 0.783 0.193 0.006 0.018 3.496
Real estate 0.946 0.052 0.000 0.002 0.677
Services 0.982 0.014 0.000 0.004 0.623
year: 2005
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.990 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.132
Construction 0.985 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.066
Manufacturing 0.942 0.053 0.003 0.002 1.011
Utilities 0.928 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.345
Transportation 0.971 0.025 0.001 0.003 0.616
Wholesale 0.968 0.027 0.001 0.003 0.656
Finance 0.790 0.169 0.002 0.039 4.910
Real estate 0.966 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.255
Services 0.985 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.550
Source: Establishment and Enterprise Census (microdata).20 
 
Table5 Transition of Foreign-Capital Ratio, According to Industry (continued)
year: 2008
Foreign capital ratio
0% 0%～49% 50%～99% 100% average(%)
Mining 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.237
Construction 0.979 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.269
Manufacturing 0.944 0.049 0.002 0.005 1.532
Utilities 0.886 0.114 0.000 0.000 1.446
Transportation 0.982 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.479
Wholesale 0.970 0.024 0.001 0.004 0.861
Finance 0.832 0.145 0.011 0.011 3.162
Real estate 0.968 0.027 0.003 0.002 0.703
Services 0.990 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.289























































































Active Job Openings to Applicants 
(AJOA) (excluding part-time 
workers)
 
Source:  Ministry  of Health,  Labour, and  Welfare Employment  Referrals  for  General 
Workers. 